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NOTES
BLAZER V. WALL: THE RESTRICTION OF THE
EASEMENT BY RESERVATION DOCTRINE
Hanna Warhank*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Montana Supreme Court recently decided Blazer v. Wall, an opin-
ion that has dramatically changed the requirements of a valid property ease-
ment.1 Before Blazer, creating an easement required the certificate of sur-
vey depicting the easement to be incorporated into the deed as to give par-
ties notice of the easement. 2 Blazer greatly enhanced the standard for an
adequate description by requiring a showing of the use or necessity of the
easement and a specific identification of the dominant and servient tene-
ments.3 This decision will have a tremendous impact on easement law in
the future because many existing easements in Montana fail to meet these
demanding new requirements.
The Montana Supreme Court's decision in Blazer failed to follow prior
case law in Montana and, instead, applied a rule cited by an Indiana appel-
late court. The Indiana rule provided that to create an easement, the domi-
nant and servient tenement must be clearly identified.4 Notably, this deci-
sion impacted the specificity needed for the creation of an easement in
Montana in the future.
* Hanna Warhank graduated from the University of Montana School of Law in 2009. She cur-
rently practices with Church, Harris, Johnson & Williams, P.C.
1. Blazer v. Wall, 183 P.3d 84 (Mont. 2008). Blazer was a split 4-3 decision. Id.
2. Halverson v. Turner, 885 P.2d 1285, 1288-1289 (Mont. 1994).
3. Blazer, 183 P.3d at 100.
4. Lennertz v. Yohn, 79 N.E.2d 414, 417 (Ind. App. 1948).
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This note will analyze the ramifications of the new easement require-
ments set forth in Blazer-requirements that require great specificity as to
the dominant and servient tenement. The current rule as adopted in Mon-
tana is more demanding than the rule enunciated by the Indiana Appellate
Courts. Part I provides an overview of basic easement law and the ease-
ment by reference doctrine before Blazer. Next, Part III discusses the fac-
tual and procedural background of Blazer. Part IV focuses on the holdings
of the majority and the basis of the dissent. Part V provides an analysis of
the Indiana law adopted in Blazer and the current body of case law regard-
ing this rule in Indiana. Finally, the note concludes with an examination of
the potential problems with Montana easement law as a result of this deci-
sion.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Basic Easement Law
An easement "is a non-possessory interest in land,"5 meaning an ease-
ment holder may use land owned by another individual. There are two
types of easements: easements in gross and easements appurtenant. 6 An
easement in gross is owned by a particular person and does not transfer with
the land.7 In contrast, an appurtenant easement "benefits a particular parcel
of land," and the easement passes with the title of the land.8 An appurte-
nant easement, such as the easement at issue in Blazer, must have both a
dominant and servient tenement.9 The land burdened by the easement is
known as the servient tenement, while the benefitted land "to which an
easement is attached," is known as the dominant tenement.' 0
Under Montana law, an easement can be created in three ways: 1) by
an instrument in writing; 2) by operation of law; or 3) by prescription."
The Montana Supreme Court has "recognized the creation of easements"
through an instrument in writing "by express grant, reservation, exception,
or covenant."l 2 An express easement can be created by using "appropriate
language in the instrument of conveyance."' 3 An express easement can also
be created using an instrument of conveyance by referring "to a recorded
plat or certificate of survey on which the easement is adequately de-
5. Blazer, 183 P.3d at 93.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Mont. Code Ann. § 70-17-103 (2007).
11. Blazer, 183 P.3d at 93.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 94.
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scribed."l 4 Under Montana Code Annotated § 76-3-304, a recorded plat
depicting an easement can establish such an easement.' 5 Additionally, case
law expanded easement creation not only through a plat, but also a certifi-
cate of survey.16 Finally, an easement created through reference to a certifi-
cate of survey is an easement by reference.17
B. The Law before Blazer
Prior to Blazer, the Court held an adequate description on a certificate
of survey was a showing of the use or necessity of the easement that created
valid easement rights.18 In Majers v. Shining Mountains, a purchaser of a
subdivision lot had access to the private easement rights of all common
areas and roadways depicted on recorded plats.19 In that case, the purchas-
ers filed an action to establish and enforce Shining Mountain to construct a
road and common areas as depicted on a filed plat. 2 0 Because the purchas-
ers' sales transaction documents referenced the recorded plats depicting the
roads, 2 1 the Court held the plat established the easement, but did not create
an obligation for Shining Mountain to create those roads. 2 2 The Court
stated that "selling lots with reference to a map or plat designating streets,
parks, or other open areas creates an implied covenant that the streets,
parks, or other open areas exist and shall be used in the manner desig-
nated." 2 3 Likewise, in Pearson v. Virginia City Ranches Assn., the Court
held "an easement arises when a purchaser's deed refers to a plat where an
easement is depicted and labeled." 2 4 In that case, the subdivision owners
filed a plat with a clearly depicted and labeled bridle path for the use of all
homeowners, and all deeds from the sale of the lots referred to this properly
recorded plat. 2 5 The Court applied Majers, and ruled the bridle path was a
valid easement created through the filing of the plat reference in the deed. 2 6
14. Id. (citing Bache v. Owens, 883 P.2d 817, 822 (Mont. 1994); Halverson, 885 P.2d at 1289).
15. Majers v. Shining Mts., 711 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Mont. 1986).
16. Bache, 883 P.2d at 821. In Bache, the Court held the certificate of survey "meets the definition
of a 'plat,'" as defined in the Mont. Code Ann. § 76-3-103(11) and therefore allowed a certificate of
survey to establish an easement just as a plat can through Mont. Code Ann § 76-3-304. Id.
17. The Blazer majority and dissent generally reference this as the "easement-by-reference" doc-
trine. Blazer, 183 P.3d 84.
18. Halverson, 885 P.2d at 1288-1289.
19. Majers, 711 P.2d at 1376.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1376, 1378.
23. Id. at 1377-1378.
24. Pearson v. Va. City Ranches Assn., 993 P.2d 688, 693 (Mont. 2000).
25. Id. at 691-692.
26. Id. at 693.
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Furthermore, the Court in Benson v. Pyfer held that when "land is sold
with reference to a properly recorded plat, the plat becomes part of (i.e., is
incorporated into) the document conveying the interest in land." 2 7 In Ben-
son, the Court held under Montana Code Annotated § 76-3-304, an ease-
ment is created for the "purchaser's benefit with respect to improvements
represented on the plat." 28 The easement by reference doctrine clearly es-
tablished that easements could be created by the depiction of a common
area in a properly recorded plat.29 As seen in Majers, Pearson, and Benson,
the Montana Supreme Court consistently held that reference to a properly
recorded plat depicting and labeling an easement creates the easement when
referenced in, and therefore incorporated into, the deed.
In addition, the Court expanded the easement by reference doctrine to
allow for the creation of an easement through a recorded certificate of sur-
vey.30 In Bache v. Owens, a tract of land was divided into two parcels.3 '
Tract 2 was sold to Owens through a deed containing a metes and bounds
description along with a reference stating, "Tract 2 shown on Certificate of
Survey No. 1657" ("COS 1657").32 COS 1657 depicted Tracts 1 and 2,
along with a dotted line of 30 feet east of, and parallel to, the western
boundary of Tract 2. The dotted line extended from the northern boundary
of Tract 2 to the southern boundary of Tract 2. The area between the dotted
line and the western boundary of Tract 2 was labeled "P[rivate] R[oadway]
E[asement]" 33 In Bache, the plaintiffs claimed the reference in the deed to
the COS depicting the easement established an easement for their use, and
they asked the Court to expand the easement by reference doctrine to allow
a COS to create an easement.34 The Court was reluctant to allow a COS to
be incorporated into the deed to create an easement,35 but decided the COS
was detailed enough to meet the requirements of a plat as used in the
Code.36 Therefore, the Court concluded Certificate of Survey No. 1657
"identifie[d] the easement clearly and specifically" with the dotted line and
a label signifying a "private roadway easement," and that it "was filed with
the county clerk and recorder, as required by law."37 With this ruling, the
27. Benson v. Pyfer, 783 P.2d 923, 925 (Mont. 1989).
28. Id. at 925; Majers, 711 P.2d at 1377.
29. Id.
30. Bache, 883 P.2d at 826.
31. Id. at 819.
32. Id.
33. I The easement was labeled "P.R.E." which the legend stated meant Private Roadway Ease-
ment. Id.
34. Bache, 883 P.2d at 819.
35. Id. at 820-822.
36. Id. at 821.
37. Id. at 822.
186 Vol. 71
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Montana Supreme Court recognized a COS could be incorporated into a
deed to establish an easement.38
Additionally, the Supreme Court ruled a map or plat can be used to
"express, confirm, or amplify" a property description used on an instrument
conveying title.39 In Halverson v. Turner, the deed conveying land referred
to a recorded certificate of survey which depicted a roadway easement."4
By looking to the deed and COS, the Court held where the deed conveying
land referenced a recorded COS, the COS was incorporated into the transfer
documents and created the easement.41 However, "[i]n determining the ex-
istence of an easement by reservation in documents of conveyance, it is
necessary that the grantee of the property being burdened by the servitude
have knowledge of its use or its necessity." 42 Therefore, an easement can
only be created through a COS by "clearly show[ing]" and "adequately
describ[ing]" the roadway, 43 so as to give notice to the servient tenement of
the use or necessity of the easement.
Furthermore, the Court provided an important distinction for "clearly
showing" and "adequately describing" an easement in a COS. In Tungsten
Holdings, Inc. v. Parker, the COS showed a meandering strip of land 40
feet wide and approximately 2,700 feet long, which was identified simply
as "lot 34."44 Even though lot 34 looked very similar to a roadway, the
Court held the resemblance alone was not enough to clearly show an ease-
ment.45 The Court stated "[e]asements by reservation must be created or
reserved in writing," and "Tungsten can point to no deed or plat which
contains any language dedicating or identifying lot 34 as a roadway." 46 The
importance of the easement being labeled a road becomes evident by look-
ing to the Bache, Halverson, and Tungsten holdings.
III. CASE BACKGROUND
A. Facts of Blazer v. Wall
In Blazer, the tracts of land at issue were originally part of one large
parcel owned by James McCready and Jack Davis.47 In 1979, the two men
split the large parcel into seven smaller tracts, named Tract 1-Tract 7,
38. Id. at 821.
39. Blazer, 183 P.3d at 96 (citing Halverson, 885 P.2d at 1288).
40. 885 P.2d at 1287.
41. Id. at 1289.
42. Id. at 1288-1289.
43. Id.
44. Tungsten Holdings, Inc. v. Parker, 938 P.2d 641 (Mont. 1997).
45. Id. at 643.
46. Id.
47. Blazer, 183 P.3d. at 88.
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which were described and depicted on Certificate of Survey number 4446
("COS 4446").48 COS 4446 depicted a dotted line originating at Whitefish
Stage Road, a public road running along the northern boundary of Tract 1,
and turning south along the eastern boundary of both Tract 1 and Tract 4.49
The road continued past the southern boundary of Tract 4 and turned
west.50 These seven tracts underwent a series of different conveyances, 5 '
the most important of which occurred in October of 1987.52 In this transac-
tion, Davis conveyed Tract I to Robert and Connie Lockman.5 3 The "Da-
vis-Lockman deed" contained a legal description of the tract and a metes
and bounds description. Further, the deed stated "Subject to 30 foot road
easement as shown on Certificate of Survey No. 4446, records of Flathead
County, Montana." 54 After a series of transfers, Blazer became the owner
of the west side of Tract 4, the land which the easement touches, as well as
other parcels to the south and west of the Tract 4.55 The Wahlders currently
reside on Tract 1, which is owned by the Sugar Shack Land Trust of which
the defendant, Wall, is the trustee. 5 6
Historically, Davis used this easement for agricultural and farming
purposes to access Tract 4 and other parcels he owned to the south and west
of Tract 4.57 The easement was later used for recreational purposes, such as
motorcycle and all-terrain vehicle riding.58 The easement road is presently
overgrown and farmed by Blazer on Tract 4.59 In 1999, the Wahlders
placed a home by the southwest corner of Tract 1, and later added a large
metal shop and two retaining walls to the west of their home. 6 0 An en-
croachment survey commissioned by Blazer showed both the retaining
walls, half of the shop, an electric transformer, and a propane tank were
placed within the 30-foot road easement depicted in COS 4446.61
B. Case Procedure
After the survey was complete, Blazer filed an action in district court
"seeking a declaration that he ha[d] an express easement for ingress and
48. Id. (see also infra nn. 192-193 and accompanying diagrams).
49. Id. at 88.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 89.
52. Id.
53. Blazer, 183 P.3d at 89.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 91.
59. Blazer, 183 P.3d at 89.
60. Id. at 90.
61. Id.
Vol. 71188
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egress purposes along the northern and western boundaries of Tract 1.1"62
He further "requested an injunction requiring the [defendants] to remove all
obstructions interfering with his use of the easement." 63 The defendants
denied the easement existed, and raised the defenses of estoppel, waiver,
statute of limitations, laches, acquiescence, and unclean hands.64 Also, they
asserted a counterclaim of adverse possession of this land. 6 5
Blazer filed a motion for summary judgment arguing COS 4446 re-
served the easement for the benefit of Tract 4 and other parcels to the south
and west originally owned by Davis. 66 The "District Court ruled that the
Davis-Lockman deed and COS 4446 'create[d] the easement alleged by
[Blazer]."' 67 In support of this decision, the district court stated "[t]he COS
was properly recorded, and it identifies the easement clearly and specifi-
cally." 6 8 However, the district court found genuine issues of material fact
remained with regard to the adverse possession claim.69
A non-jury trial was held on the remaining issue of adverse posses-
sion.70 After the district court heard testimony and the parties submitted
post-trial briefs, 7' the district court held that "Davis had intended to create
an easement" and that the Davis-Lockman deed together with COS 4446,
"clearly establish[ed] an easement over Tract 1 for the benefit [of] and ap-
purtenant to Tract 4 and the other lands owned by Davis lying to the [slouth
and [w]est of Tract 4 . . . ."72 The adverse possession claim was denied
because the statutory period had not been met. 7 3 The defendants appealed
the district court's decision, alleging prior case law does not support the
decision of off-survey parcels benefitting from an easement.74
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Blazer, 183 P.3d at 91.
66. Id. This decision may have come out differently had Blazer only argued for an easement across
Tract I for the benefit of just Tract 4 and not the off-survey properties. These facts would have
presented a case almost identical to Bache or Halverson, in which the easement was upheld. However,
Blazer argued the off-survey property was also the dominant tenement for this easement. In no prior
case had an easement been created for the benefit of parcels not depicted on the plat or certificate of
survey.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Blazer, 183 P.3d at 91-92.
72. Id. at 92.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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IV. BLAZER V. WALL
A. Majority
The Montana Supreme Court disagreed with the district court's hold-
ing that COS 4446 created an express easement for both Tract 4 and the off-
survey property to the southwest.75 The Court used the Davis-Lockman
deed and COS 4446 to determine easement rights in Blazer76 because in
easement by reference cases, the decisive transaction documents are those
associated with the original land division.77 For a certificate of survey de-
piction to create an easement, the easement must be shown on the docu-
ments associated with the original division of the parcel.78 COS 4446 was
the survey depicting the original land division by Davis and McCready and
therefore was the correct document to analyze.79 The Davis-Lockman deed
was the original deed reserving the easement rights; therefore, the Court
used it to determine the easement rights at issue.80
To determine the extent of the alleged express easement, the majority
first analyzed the express language in the Davis-Lockman deed.8t The deed
included a metes and bounds property description and the phrase "Subject
to 30 foot road easement as shown on Certificate of Survey No. 4446."82
However, according to prior Montana Supreme Court holdings, the words
"subject to" alone do not create an easement.83 In Wild River Adventures v.
Board of Trustees, a parcel of land was transferred through a warranty deed
that stated "[s]ubject to and together with a 40 foot private road easement
... ."84 The plaintiffs in Wild River Adventures argued this language cre-
ated an easement across the defendant's land, but the Court disagreed. It
held, "[t]he words 'subject to' used in their ordinary sense, mean
subordinate to, subservient to or limited by."85 Similarly, in Blazer, the
majority held nothing in the use of the words "subject to" in the Davis-
75. Id. at 107.
76. Id. at 98.
77. Blazer, 183 P.3d at 97.
78. Id. (citing Ruana v. Grigonis, 913 P.2d 1247, 1252-1253 (Mont. 1996)).
79. Id. at 98. Additionally, the law requires the grantor of the easement be party to the conveyance
and have intended to reserve his own previously-held right to use the servient estate after he sells the
divided parcel for the benefit of a third party. Id. at 97 (citing Kelly, 972 P.2d 1117, 1124 (Mont.
1998)).
80. Id. at 98.
81. Id. at 94.
82. Id.
83. Blazer, 183 P.3d at 94 (citing Bache, 883 P.2d at 821 (citations omitted)).
84. Wild River Adventures v. Bd. of Trustees, 812 P.2d 344, 345 (Mont. 1991).
85. Id. at 346-347.
Vol. 71190
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Lockman deed would create or reserve a property right.86 Therefore, the
deed standing alone did not create an easement.17
Because the words "subject to" were insufficient to create an ease-
ment, the majority looked to COS 4446 to determine if it could be incorpo-
rated into the deed to establish the easement.8 8 To decide if an easement
was created through the reference to COS 4446, the majority developed a
two-step analysis: 89 1) whether the Certificate of Survey was incorporated
into the deed and 2) whether the description of the easement was ade-
quate. 90 As to the first step, the Davis-Lockman deed contained a metes
and bounds description and a reference to COS 4446.91 The clear reference
to COS 4446 on the face of the deed allowed for the incorporation of the
survey into the deed and all subsequent deeds making similar references. 9 2
Therefore, COS 4446 was incorporated, but before the easement could be
created, Blazer also had to establish the easement was adequately described
on this survey.
The Blazer majority turned to the second step of the analysis to deter-
mine whether COS 4446 had an adequate description to create the ease-
ment.9 3 Before Blazer, merely labeling an easement as a road on a COS
was enough to adequately describe the easement because it gave knowledge
of the use or necessity of the easement. 94 The majority analyzed whether
an easement was created for the benefit of Tract 4 or the southwest off-
survey property separately but concluded the description was inadequate to
create an easement for the benefit of either property.95
First, in analyzing the southwest, off-survey property, it should be
noted that Davis's property to the south and west of Tract 4 was not identi-
fied in the Davis-Lockman deed or on COS 4446.96 The majority deter-
mined "an easement appurtenant has not been 'adequately described' when
the identity of the dominant tenement has been omitted and cannot be ascer-
tained from the documents of conveyance."9 7 Since COS 4446 did not de-
86. Blazer, 183 P.3d at 94.
87. Id. (citing Ruana, 913 P.2d at 1252-1253).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 98. The majority shifts the weight of the analysis from incorporation, as was the focus in
prior cases, to specificity of the certificate of survey.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 89.
92. Blazer, 183 P.3d at 89.
93. Id. at 99 (citing Halverson, 885 P.2d at 1289; Ruana, 913 P.2d 1253). The majority states the
issue of adequacy of the description in COS 4446 is the "dispositive issue" in this case. Id.
94. See Bache, 883 P.2d 817; Halverson, 885 P.2d 1285.
95. Blazer, at 99-102.
96. Id. at 99.
97. Id. at 100 (citing Lennertz, 79 N.E.2d at 417).
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pict where the easement road ended,98 the majority found the easement was
not adequately described. 99 In further analyzing the adequacy of the
description, the majority followed prior case law and continued to require
the servient tenement know of the use or necessity of the easement.' *
However, the majority established an additional requirement by adopting
the Indiana appellate court rule requiring both the servient and dominant
tenement must be ascertainable "with reasonable certainty" to create a valid
easement' 0 ' First, the Blazer majority found the scope of the easement can-
not be defined from the depiction on COS 4446, and thus, the use and ne-
cessity are not clearly shown.' 0 2 Next, the dominant tenement could not be
adequately described because the benefitted property was not even depicted
on the COS.103 Because the off-survey property failed both tests for ade-
quate description, the majority held an easement for access to off-survey
property could not be clearly established by COS 4446.104
Next, the majority determined a valid easement was not created for the
benefit of Tract 4.105 Similarly to the off-survey property, the majority held
COS 4446 did not clearly depict Tract 4 as the dominant tenement.' 0 6 The
majority found COS 4446 did not clearly identify the dominant and servient
tenements, leaving identification to "inference, implication, or extrinsic evi-
dence." 0 7  The Court opined the easement depicted was ambiguous be-
cause several different interpretations of the dominant and servient tene-
ments existed such as access to Bowdish road (a nearby public road) or
access to the other Tracts depicted on COS 4446 (Tracts 2, 3, 5, 6, and
7). 108 Tract 4 could have been a dominant or servient tenement "depending
on the road's intended use or necessity which . . . is not ascertainable with
98. Id. at 88.
99. Blazer, 183 P.3d at 101.
100. Id. at 100 (citing Halverson, 885 P.2d at 1288; Ruana, 913 P.2d at 1251; Pearson, 993 P.2d at
692).
101. Id. (citing Lennertz, 79 N.E.2d at 417).
102. Id. at 99. Blazer argued even if the property was not shown on COS 4446, it was depicted
through other deeds or could be established by testimony of historical use. Id. The use of extrinsic
evidence was denied because the Court does not "recognize the creation of an easement based on un-
referenced documents and post-transaction testimony as to what the parties intended." Id. at 100.
Therefore, Blazer could use nothing but COS 4446 to clearly establish the easement. Id. at 99. The
majority stated "the mere fact that the grantor intended a particular property to benefit from a reserved
easement is insufficient; that intent must be expressed in the written documents of conveyance." Id. at
100. The majority held this intent "must be clearly and unmistakably communicated, and not left to
inference, implication, or extrinsic evidence." Id. at 101.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Blazer, 183 P.3d at 101.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 101-102.
108. Id. at 102.
192 Vol. 71
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reasonable certainty from COS 4446."109 The Court found the description
of the easement on COS 4446 was inadequate as to either parcel, so no
easement was established for Blazer's use.110
The Blazer holding significantly changed the standard of notice re-
quired to the servient tenement; however, had the majority simply followed
previous case law in Montana, an easement would have been created by
COS 4446. In Pearson, the Court determined the servient tenement must
have knowledge of the use or necessity of an easement to be created."'
This knowledge was sufficient if the servient tenement was put on "inquiry
notice.""i 2 The plat in Pearson merely showed a labeled bridle path ease-
ment.' 1 3 The Court held the depiction of the easement was enough to give
notice to the servient estate holders.1 14 If the majority in Blazer would have
used the prior standard, the Court would have held the road easement pic-
tured on COS 4446 clearly showed the use or necessity of the road. COS
4446 showed the easement, labeled as a 30 foot easement road, which be-
gan at Whitefish Stage Road continuing across Tract 1, which gave access
to Tract 4.115 Prior to Blazer, the Court held a label on the road was
enough to show the use or necessity and therefore was an adequate descrip-
tion. Now, the new, strict Blazer standard demands a showing of both the
use or necessity of the easement and the dominant and servient tene-
ments. 116
In Blazer, the majority attempted to distinguish Bache, Halverson, and
Pearson from the newly adopted rule.' 17 The Blazer majority stated, "we
have never recognized an easement created to benefit a dominant tenement
that was not ascertainable from the referenced plat or certificate of sur-
vey." 18 When distinguishing Bache and Halverson from Blazer, the ma-
jority emphasized the importance of a property owner's access to a public
road through the easement." 9 According to the Blazer majority's reliance
on Bache, "It was clear from this depiction and labeling that the easement
burdened Tract 2 for the benefit of Tract 1 to provide access from Tract 1 to
the state route."l 20 Similarly, the Blazer majority's analysis of Halverson
109. Id.
110. Id. at 105-106.
111. Pearson, 993 P.2d at 692.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 691.
114. Id. at 692.
115. Blazer, 183 P.3d at 89.
116. Blazer, 183 P.3d at 100 (citing Lennertz, 79 N.E.2d at 417).
117. Id. at 100-101.
118. Id. at 100.
119. Id. at 100-101. The importance of the easements access to a public road was not analyzed in
either Bache or Halverson.
120. Id. at 101.
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looked to the adequate depiction of the easement by noting the dominant
estate was landlocked if not for the easement, making a determination of the
dominant tenement ascertainable.121 The Blazer majority also noted in ex-
amining Pearson that the "clearly depicted and labeled" bridle path was for
the use of all lot owners and showed the dominant tenement.122
In Blazer, the easement road was the only road giving access to Tract 4
from Whitefish Stage Road.123 If this inference was enough to establish the
dominant and servient tenements in Bache and Halverson, it should like-
wise be enough to show Tract 4 is benefited by the road crossing Tract 1 to
Whitefish Stage Road. However, it is clear from the strict holding in Blazer
and the denial of the easement that inferences cannot be drawn from COS
4446. The majority does not clearly define for future cases the "reasonable
certainty" standard necessary to establish the dominant and servient estates.
However, the Court is unlikely to hold that inferences drawn from the cer-
tificate of survey will be enough. The majority's dicta suggested any ambi-
guity could be clarified by inferences on the certificate of surveyl 24; how-
ever, the majority clearly stated that the intent to reserve an easement for
the benefit of a dominant tenement must be "clearly and unmistakably com-
municated" and not left to inference or implication. 125
B. Dissent
The dissent wrote that the majority "misstate[d] our previous ease-
ment-by-reference decisions, and confound[ed] this already complicated
body of law."' 26 Contrary to the majority's opinion, the dissent argued an
easement was created across Tract 1 for the benefit of Tract 4,127 but agreed
with the majority that COS 4446 could not create an easement for the bene-
fit of the off-survey parcels.128 The dissent pointed out the "Court previ-
ously has required little more than a simple labeled depiction of an ease-
ment on a survey or plat to create a valid easement." 29 COS 4446 clearly
showed and labeled a roadway easement passing through Tract 1,130 and
because of the location of the easement the dissent states owners of Tract 1
would have had notice of the easement's use or necessity. 1'
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 88-90.
124. Blazer at 100-101.
125. Id. at 101.
126. Id. at 108 (Morris, Leaphart, & Warner, JJ., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Blazer, 183 P.3d at 108 (Morris, Leaphart, & Warner, JJ., dissenting).
129. Id. at 109.
130. Id. at 88 (majority).
131. Id. at 109 (Morris, Leaphart, & Warner, JJ., dissenting).
Vol. 71194
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Furthermore, the dissent conceded "subject to" alone could not create
an easement, but argued the words read in conjunction with COS 4446
could establish an easement for the benefit of Tract 4.132 The dissent as-
serted that "Wild River deems 'subject to' to be words of 'qualification;'
therefore, the language in the Davis-Lockman Deed could clarify any ambi-
guity on the COS.133 The dissent argued that "subject to" can differ in its
meaning, depending on the circumstances surrounding the parties' agree-
ment. In support of this argument it cited a section of American Jurispru-
dence Deeds that said "subject to" can clarify the easement depiction.134
Therefore, the dissent concluded the "subject to" language could be used to
clarify the intent of the parties when looking at COS 4446.135 The "'sub-
ject to' language in the Davis-Lockman deed, stating that Tract 1 is subject
to the easement depicted on COS 4446, clarifies and qualifies what other-
wise would be an ambiguous depiction."1 36 Tract 1 being subject to an
easement means Tract 1 is the servient estate and Tract 4 is the dominant
estate.137 According to the dissent, COS 4446 clearly depicted a roadway
easement and the "subject to" language in the Davis-Lockman deed cleared
up any ambiguity regarding the dominant and servient tenement.138 There-
fore, the incorporation of COS 4446 into the deed created an easement for
the benefit of Tract 4 but not any off-survey properties.139
The majority and dissent in Blazer disagreed whether an easement was
created for the benefit of Tract 4, but neither group relied solely on the
existing case law in Montana. The dissent relied upon the second edition of
American Jurisprudence Deeds to use "subject to" to clarify the dominant
and servient tenements, a rule never before adopted by the Montana Su-
preme Court. Furthermore, the majority relied upon language from a 1948
Indiana appellate court decision, Lennertz v. Yohn, to deny COS 4446 cre-
ated any easement rights. The majority merely cited the language from
Lennertz, without fully analyzing the current state of this law in Indiana. In
doing so, the majority created a more demanding rule than even the existing
law in Indiana.
132. Blazer, 183 P.3d at 110-111.
133. Id. at 111.
134. Id. at 110 (citing 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 246 (2002)). Wild River determined "subject to"
language standing alone does not create a deed. Id. at 94. This case relied upon 23 Am. Jur. Deeds
§ 293 (1983) for common usage of "subject to." Id. at 185 (citing Wild River, 812 P.2d at 346-347).
The dissent uses the newer edition to define "subject to." Id. at 110 (Morris, Leaphart, & Warner, JJ.,
dissenting) (citing 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 246).
135. Id. at 110-111 (Morris, Leaphart, & Warner, JJ., dissenting). Blazer never argued "subject to"
alone created the easement. Id.
136. Id. at I10.
137. Blazer, 183 P.3d at 110-I11.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 108, 111.
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V. LENNERTZ v. YOHN' INDIANA'S EASEMENT DOCTRINE
The strict test requiring an "adequate description" of both the domi-
nant and servient tenement of an easement, as adopted in Blazer, came from
an Indiana court of appeals case, Lennertz.14 0 Several problems arise from
the Montana Supreme Court adopting language from this case. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court did not need to look to Indiana for case law because
Montana's existing body of law provided an answer to the issue. Also, the
Montana Supreme Court's interpretation of Lennertz was incorrectly ap-
plied for three reasons. First, Lennertz is distinguishable from Blazer. Sec-
ond, the doctrine as stated in Lennertz does not accurately portray Indiana
law. Third, the rule in Lennertz, though not overruled in Indiana, is not as
rigid as the Montana Supreme Court construed it.
In Lennertz, two neighboring landowners, Carlson and Rumbaugh,
signed and properly recorded an agreement stating, "We hereby enter into
an agreement between Blanche Carlson and Lawrence and Dorothy
Rumbaugh the right to use the present drive between properties of same for
driveway purposes for ninety-nine years for sum of $10.00 and further
agree to help maintain upkeep of driveway."l41 Thereafter, the Rumbaughs
sold their property to Yohn; the deed contained no restrictions or reserva-
tions.142 The Carlsons executed a warranty deed selling their land to Len-
nertz; this deed also did not contain any restrictions or reservations. 14 3
Yohn used and maintained this driveway until he eventually erected a fence
blocking the passageway.144 The Lennertz court stated the issue as whether
the agreement was "sufficient to create an interest easement or a covenant
which runs with the land .... ."145 To determine whether the easement was
appurtenant, the court stated, "The instrument by which an easement by
express grant is created should describe with reasonable certainty the ease-
ment created and the dominant and servient tenements."1 46 This language
140. Lennertz, 79 N.E.2d at 417.
141. Id. at 415.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 416.
144. Id.
145. Lennertz, 79 N.E.2d at 417.
146. Id. This is the exact quotation the Blazer majority adopted in its analysis. See Blazer, 183 P.3d
at 100.
196 Vol. 71
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was first adopted in Indiana by Ross v. Valentine,147 but originally comes
from Corpus Juris Secundum on Easements.' 4 8
The Lennertz court held that an easement in gross was created through
the written agreement; 149 therefore, the easement rights did not pass with
the land to Lennertz or Yohn.o50 The agreement was insufficient to estab-
lish an easement appurtenant because it did not describe "with reasonable
certainty" the dominant and servient tenements. 5 ' The agreement included
no description of where the land or easement was located, contained no
plat, and did not say whether it created the easement for the benefit of a
specified person or land.15 2 Thereafter, when the land was conveyed to
other parties, no reservations or restrictions were in the deed, showing no
intent to pass an easement to new landowners.' 5 3 The Lennertz court held,
"any rights created by the agreement ... were personal in character and
[sic] in the absence of a reservation, condition, or restriction in a deed ...
the appellees acquired no rights thereunder when they purchased their prop-
erty, and said agreement . . . did not create a covenant or easement which
[sic] runs with the land . . . ."154
The written document in Lennertz simply stated an easement for right-
of-way was created, but it did not provide any other information. The Len-
nertz court determined an easement to be in gross unless a clear showing of
appurtenance to the land to be burdened had been established; "A reserva-
tion of an easement is not operative in favor of land not described in the
conveyance."' 55 The court in Lennertz failed to find reference to any parcel
of land in the conveyance of the easement; therefore, it assumed the ease-
ment was meant to benefit a person. 15 6 The easement was for the use of the
147. Ross v. Valentine, 63 N.E.2d 691, 695 (Ind. App. 1945). The rule that an easement should
describe with reasonable certainty the dominant and servient tenements was used by the Indiana Court
of Appeals to determine whether or not an easement was meant to be appurtenant or in gross. Id. The
court held the deed stating "[t]he grantors reserving the right of 14 feet on the west side of the above
described real estate for a roadway and also hereby giving and granting to the grantees herein a roadway
for ingress and egress of 14 feet on the west side of 6.91 acres immediately north of the aforesaid 5 acres
hereby conveyed and also hereby giving and granting to the grantees herein a roadway for ingress and
agrees [sic] of 14 feet on the west side of the 3 acres immediately south of the aforesaid 5 acres hereby
conveyed." Id. at 692. This language was sufficient to show the parties had intended an easement
appurtenant to run with the land. Id. at 695.
148. Id. at 695.
149. Lennertz, 79 N.E.2d at 417.
150. Id. at 417.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Lennertz, 79 N.E.2d at 417 (citing 28 C.J.S. Easements § 29 (1948), at 686). This rule is stated
immediately after the rule establishing a showing of the dominant and servient tenements. Id.
156. Id.
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Carlsons and Rumbaughs and was an easement in gross.' 57 The court's
determination weighed heavily on the fact that no mention was made of
land to be benefitted by the easement, it only made reference to certain
people. Therefore, the court ruled the easement must have been meant to be
in gross.' 58
The distinction between Lennertz and Blazer is tremendous. First of
all, Lennertz regarded a written agreement between two landowners reserv-
ing an easement and not a reference in a certificate of survey. The Lennertz
agreement was not made during the split of a larger parcel of land into
smaller tracts, as in Blazer, but was merely an agreement between two adja-
cent landowners. Next, the written agreement in Lennertz contained no
land description or easement location; it merely used the word "easement."
In Blazer, the location of the land and the location of the easement were not
at issue; the plat clearly showed the location of both. These distinctions are
important because an Indiana court would most likely not apply the Len-
nertz rule to the Blazer facts, if faced with such a situation.
Perhaps more importantly, the court in Lennertz and Blazer addressed
different issues. In Blazer, the issue focused on the adequacy of the
description of the easement in the COS; while in Lennertz, the issue turned
on whether the easement was appurtenant or in gross. As stated by the
court throughout Lennertz, the written agreement lacked an adequate
description of the land or the easement. The purpose of the rule requiring
identification of the tenements used in Lennertz was to determine the nature
of the easement, not the adequacy of the description of an easement. Be-
cause of these distinctions, the rule from Lennertz should not have been
applied in Blazer.
Furthermore, Indiana case law shows the rule set forth in Lennertz is
not as demanding as the rule adopted by the Montana Supreme Court. The
Lennertz rule in Indiana is used to determine whether an easement is appur-
tenant or in gross.' 5 9 Chase v. Nelson, a later Indiana court of appeals deci-
sion, clarified the Lennertz rule of dominant and servient tenements. In
Chase, as in Lennertz, the parties tried to determine if an easement was
appurtenant.' 60 The warranty deed stated, "[t]he grantors [Ledbetters] to
furnish 3 feet and 5 inches off the east side of their lot 67 and the grantee
[Alspaugh] to furnish 3 feet and 5 inches off the west side of her lot, ... for
the use of said driveway . . . ."161 From this language, the Chase court
found "the dominant tenement was the Alspaugh (now Nelson) tract while
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Chase v. Nelson, 507 N.E.2d 640, 642 (Ind. App. 1987).
161. Id.
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the servient tenement was the Ledbetter (now Chase) tract." 1 62 The Chase
court stated "[i]n construing an alleged creation of an easement through
grant or reservation, no particular words are necessary; any words [that]
clearly show the intention to give an easement are sufficient."l 6 3 Though
the language used in the warranty deed to establish the easement was not
"artfully drafted," it was sufficient to identify the dominant and servient
estate holders.' 6 The Court recognized a lack of necessity for an unequiv-
ocally clear showing of the dominant and servient tenements, and any lan-
guage that showed intent to "give an easement" was sufficient to create
such an easement appurtenant to run with the land.165
In Oakes v. Hattabaugh, the Indiana court of appeals was faced with
another easement dispute because the "deeds failed to name any dominant
tenement or specify that the easement was created in favor of any particular
landowner."1 6 6 Big Ten owned land adjacent to two lots owned by Oakes
and Kents that had a driveway easement that both parties used, but Big
Ten's deed did not contain any easement provisions concerning the adjacent
property.16 7 The Indiana court of appeals used the Lennertz rule to deter-
mine the existence of an appurtenant easement with the showing of the
dominant and servient tenements.16 8 The court stated "the deeds identified
the easement's precise location on the Oakes' property. However, the
deeds failed to name any dominant tenement or specify that the easement
was created in favor of any particular parcel." 6 9 The court stated that when
an easement is located on certain property, it will "inherently" identify this
property as the servient tenement.o7 0 Therefore, the court held the Oakes
owned the servient tenement, as they owned the land on which the easement
was located."'7 However, no easement could be created for the benefit of
Big Ten because Big Ten had never been mentioned in any deeds and could
not be identified as the dominant tenement.172 In a footnote, the court was
uncertain whether the Kent's property was sufficiently shown as the domi-
nant tenement to the easement, but the court was not asked to answer such a
162. Id.
163. Id. at 642-643 (citing 11 I.L.E. Easements § 14 (1958); 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses
§ 20 (1966)).
164. Id. at 642.
165. Id. at 642-643.
166. Oakes v. Hattabaugh, 631 N.E.2d 949, 951 (Ind. App. 1994).
167. Id. at 950.
168. Id. at 951.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 952.
171. Id. at 952.
172. Oakes, 631 N.E.2d at 952.
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question.' 7 3 This footnote left the question of the adequacy of the identity
of a dominant tenement open.
Another Indiana case, Tanton v. Grochow, clarified the adequacy
needed to show the dominant tenement, a question still remaining after
Oakes. In Tanton, the Tantons's and Grochows's predecessors in title exe-
cuted a "Joint Driveway Agreement and Consent to Encroach," which cre-
ated a joint easement straddling their property lines to be used for ingress
and egress over their respective properties.17 4 The Tantons claim the ease-
ment was unenforceable because the deed failed to "expressly identify the
dominant and servient estates."17 5 The court, citing Chase, stated the docu-
ments do not need to expressly identify estates, but an adequate description
of the dominant and servient tenements will be sufficient.176 The court
looked to the agreement and an incorporated survey, which showed the "lo-
cation of the joint driveway on the parties' respective properties."177 The
location of the easement allowed the court to determine the part of the ease-
ment located on the Tantons' land was servient for the benefit of the domi-
nant tenement, the Grochows, and the land owned by the Grochows was
servient for the benefit of the dominant tenement, the Tantons.178
In Larry Mayes Sales, Inc. v. HSI, LLC, the Indiana court of appeals
showed how little was needed to provide an adequate description of the
dominant and servient tenements.' 79 The deed containing the language,
"[t]he conveyance is further subject to, and grantor further reserves and
retains, for the use and benefit of Grantor (including the property owned by
Grantor adjacent to the real estate herein conveyed) . . . a perpetual ease-
ment for access, ingress and egress . . . ." so Again, the court faced the
issue of determining whether the easement ran with the land or was appur-
tenant.' 8 If an easement could be "fairly construed to be appurtenant to the
land, it will not be presumed to be in gross." 8 2 The court ruled the domi-
nant and servient tenements must be adequately described but do not have
to contain the actual words "dominant" or "servient."1 83 Because the deed
contained a location of the easement on the defendant's property, "it inher-
ently identifie[d] the [defendant's] property as the servient tenement."l 84
173. Id. at 952 n. 3.
174. Tanton v. Grochow, 707 N.E.2d 1010, 1012 (Ind. App. 1999).
175. Id. at 1013.
176. Id. (citing Chase, 507 N.E.2d at 642).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Larry Mayes Sales, Inc. v. HSI, LLC, 744 N.E.2d 970, 971 (Ind. App. 2001).
180. Id. at 971 (Ind. App. 2001) (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 972.
182. Id. at 973.
183. Id. (citing Tanton, 707 N.E.2d at 1013).
184. Id.
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Furthermore, the court determined the dominant estate was also adequately
described because the language in the deed stated the easement was "for the
use and benefit of [the] Grantor;" therefore, a valid easement right was cre-
ated.185 The court realized a property description would be better than the
mere mention of "adjacent property," but a property description was enough
to be an adequate description of the dominant tenement to allow for the
creation of an appurtenant easement.186
Finally, in Kopetsky v. Crews, the Indiana court of appeals determined
the physical layout of the easement provided a means to adequately show
both the dominant and servient tenements. 87 In Kopetsky, the easement at
issue started at a public road and continued over Tracts A, B, and C to the
Kopetsky's land.188 Tracts A, B, and C were conveyed through a deed con-
taining the language, "Tracts A, B, and C are subject to the following de-
scribed Access Easement, which the Grantors herein reserve [land descrip-
tion of easement omitted]."189 The court stated while Indiana law "prefers"
the deed contain the identity of both tenements, "if we can identify the
dominant tenement with reasonable certainty based upon the language of
the deed, we are not required to find a direct description of that tenement in
the conveyance." 190 The deed must only provide "a means by which the
dominant tenement could be identified."'91 The court determined the deed
stating the land is subject to the access easement as reserved by the grantors
was enough to identify the dominant estate. It said, "The dominant tene-
ment must be land to which access is gained via the easement and that such
access benefits the grantors reserving such access." 92
Furthermore, the Montana Supreme Court erred because in Montana
there was no need to apply the Indiana rule because existing Montana case
law provided the answer to the issue in Blazer, and the Indiana law was
incorrectly applied. The Montana Supreme Court adopted the Lennertz rule
requirement without analyzing the scope of the rule, making the require-
ments for an adequate description in a COS unworkable in the future. The
Montana Supreme Court seems to have adopted language from Lennertz
without determining the interpretation of the law in Indiana. The Lennertz
rule in Indiana is primarily used to determine whether an easement is appur-
tenant or in gross, not to determine adequacy of description.193
185. Id. at 973.
186. Larry Mayes Sales, 744 N.E.2d. at 973-974.
187. Kopetsky v. Crews, 838 N.E.2d 1118, 1125 (Ind. App. 2005).
188. Id. at 1120-1121.
189. Id. at 1120-1122.
190. Id. at 1125-1126 (emphasis in original).
191. Id. at 1126.
192. Id. (emphasis in original).
193. Lennertz, 79 N.E.2d at 417.
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Moreover, if the Montana Supreme Court applied the current Indiana
interpretation of the Lennertz rule, Blazer's easement most likely would
have been upheld. Under current Indiana law, the servient tenement can be
inferred by looking to the location of the easement.' 94 Also, when the
physical location of two parcels "leads to only one reasonable conclusion as
to the identity of the dominant tenement, it is appropriate to consider that
physical layout in construing a grantor's express reservation of an access
easement."' 95 In Blazer, it is quite clear from the location of the easement
across Tract 1, that it was the servient tenement, and the reasonable conclu-
sion to be found by looking at COS 4446 is that Tract 4 is the dominant
tenement. So, even though the Montana Supreme Court adopted the lan-
guage from the Indiana court of appeals, which eventually led to the denial
of an easement, the easement would most likely be upheld in the same Indi-
ana court of appeals. The Montana Supreme Court adopted the Indiana
rule, but by applying it out of context, it made the rule much more demand-
ing than it is in other Indiana appellate court opinions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The newly adopted standard in Blazer greatly changed the require-
ments for an adequate description of an easement in a certificate of survey.
While prior case law accepted as little as a labeled picture of a road, now an
easement holder must show great specificity of the use and necessity of the
easement, as well as the dominant and servient tenement on both the certifi-
cate of survey and the deed. This development makes the doctrine of ease-
ment by reference almost unworkable in the future, and many easements
already established in an existing certificate of survey may be invalid.
The Montana Supreme Court chose not to follow prior case law in
Montana when deciding Blazer. Instead, it adopted language from Lennertz
but applied it in an inappropriate context. The holding in Blazer signifi-
cantly restricts the use of the easement by reference doctrine. If the Mon-
tana Supreme Court had followed prior Montana case law or even the cur-
rent law in Indiana, the likely holding in Blazer would be that the easement
was valid because Tract 4 was benefitted by the easement burdening Tract
1.
194. See generally Lennertz, 79 N.E.2d 414; Kopersky, 838 N.E.2d 1118; Larry Mayes Sales, 744
N.E.2d 970.
195. Kopetsky, 838 N.E.2d at 1125.
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